Clarke said that information about the two men was deliberately withheld from him in January 2000, at the time of a key al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which the CIA monitored. Clarke alleged that, based on his knowledge of how the CIA works, Tenet authorised the deliberate withholding. Clarke added that the information was clearly important in the summer of 2001, when the CIA knew that Almihdhar was in the country and, in the words of one of Blee’s former deputies, was “very high interest” in connection with the next al-Qaeda attack. However, the CIA continued to withhold some information from both Clarke and the FBI.

Mark Rossini, one of Blee’s former subordinates at Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, has previously admitted deliberately withholding the information from the FBI. According to Rossini, in early January 2000 he and a colleague, Doug Miller, knew they should notify the FBI that Almihdhar had a US visa and presumably intended to soon visit the US. Miller even drafted, but did not send, a cable informing the FBI of Almihdhar’s visa. However, Rossini says he and Miller were instructed by a female CIA officer known as “Michael” and Blee’s deputy, Tom Wilshire, to withhold the information.

The joint statement issued by these three men says that neither Tenet nor other senior managers were aware of the visa information at all. Neither of the two reports published after the attack, the heavily redacted 9/11 Congressional Inquiry report and the 9/11 Commission Report–the CIA inspector general’s report is still secret, except the executive summary–give the “who knew what when” for Almihdhar’s visa information. However, several CIA cables, readily accessible in the agency’s database, mentioned the visa.

Wilshire knew of the visa information; Blee almost certainly did, too. The 9/11 Commission Report states that Blee briefed his superiors, presumably including Black, about the Malaysia meeting. However, it is unclear from the report or any other source whether Blee mentioned the visa information. Some of the information Blee gave his superiors about the meeting was wildly inaccurate. For example, on January 12 he claimed the surveillance in Kuala Lumpur was still ongoing, whereas in actual fact Alec Station had sent and received several cables stating the attendees began to leave on January 8.

The joint statement quotes in support of its contention that senior management did not know of the visa information part of a sentence from the 9/11 Commission Report:

The 9/11 Commission quite correctly concluded that “…no one informed higher levels of management in either the FBI or CIA about the case.”

However, the ellipsis in the quote replaces the words,”It appears that,” indicating the commission was not entirely sure. The quote concerns the search for Almihdhar and his companion Nawaf Alhazmi in August and September 2001, not the passage of the visa information in January 2000, and the chapter from which it was taken was first drafted by Barbara Grewe, a Justice Department inspector general and 9/11 Commission staffer who was subsequently hired by a CIA contractor.

The statement, “The handling of the information in question was exhaustively looked at by the 9/11 Commission, the Congressional Joint Inquiry, the CIA Inspector General and other groups,” is also questionable. The body of the CIA inspector general’s report is still secret so its contents are unknown, but the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry did not even find Miller’s blocked cable, let alone ask him about it, and the 9/11 Commission Report is silent on the vast majority of specifics in Blee’s briefings to his superiors.

The CIA’s cable database contains records of who accessed what cable when, and a statement on which Malaysia cables Tenet read would go some way toward answering the question of what he knew. Blee’s written briefings would also be significant in this respect.

The lack of information the CIA leadership allegedly had in 2001’s “summer of threat” is even more puzzling. Tenet worked himself up into a near frenzy in the months before 9/11, mostly based on unspecific chatter about a forthcoming major bin Laden operation. For example, when Tenet demanded an immediate meeting with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on July 10, 2001, when Clarke, Black and Blee were also present, one of Tenet’s best arguments to support the idea that al-Qaeda would soon attack was, according to Tenet’s 2007 book, “late June information that cited a ‘big event’ that was forthcoming.” This is not so meaningful compared to the information the CIA had about Almihdhar and Alhazmi and should have presented to Clarke and Rice.

By late August 2001 Wilshire, and almost certainly Blee, knew that Almihdhar was in the US and Wilshire notified his CIA superiors that Almihdhar was “very high interest” in connection with the next al-Qaeda attack. If this information did not reach Tenet, as he claims, the appropriate question would again be: who failed to pass it on?

Kevin Fenton is the author of Disconnecting the Dots: How CIA and FBI Officials
Helped Enable 9/11 and Evaded Government Investigations.

The post Analyzing the CIA Response to Richard Clarke's Allegations appeared first on 9/11 Truth News.

The Moussaoui case is a poster boy for the state of our knowledge about the attacks: we have some of the details, but know some are missing. Also, two key questions remain unanswered. This despite the wealth of information that came out at the trial and the fact that Moussaoui, although largely ignored by the 9/11 Commission’s final report—partly due to the forthcoming trial—was a major topic of the Justice Department inspector general’s report into the FBI’s pre-attack failings.

>These are the bare bones of the case: Moussaoui had been a known extremist for years prior to his arrest. Before the bureau first heard his name on August 15, he had been under surveillance by French and British intelligence and the CIA, although the agency would claim it only knew him under an alias. He was sent to the US for flight training by alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, possibly to participate in 9/11, possibly to participate in a follow-up operation. However, he was a poor student and dropped out of basic flight school before obtaining a licence and went to learn about flying a Boeing 747, which aroused suspicion.

When the FBI was brought in, the Minneapolis agents realized he was dangerous and arrested him on an immigration violation—despite being told not to do so by headquarters. This was the first of many times the Minneapolis field office and FBI headquarters clashed over the case. Essentially, even though they did not know he was linked to al-Qaeda, the local agents understood the risk Moussaoui posed—one even speculated he would fly a large airliner into the World Trade Center—and they wanted a warrant to search his belongings to get information that would lead to his accomplices. On the other hand, headquarters seemed to think they were alarmist and there was nothing to the case. They kept throwing up roadblocks.

Although it is uncertain whether Moussaoui would have participated in the 9/11 attacks if he had remained free, or whether he ever met any of the nineteen hijackers, he certainly had very visible links to some of their key associates, such as Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ahmed al-Hawsawi and Yazid Sufaat. These links would have led to eleven of the nineteen. Some of the connections between what Moussaoui had in his possession and the hijackers would have been easy to make. For example, the CIA knew that Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi had stayed at Sufaat’s apartment during al-Qaeda’s January 2000 summit in Kuala Lumpur.

There were four key figures who dealt with the case at FBI headquarters: Rita Flack, an intelligence operations specialist at the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU); Michael Maltbie, a supervisory special agent with the RFU; their unit chief Dave Frasca; and Tom Wilshire, a CIA officer on loan to FBI headquarters. Wilshire was either a consultant to Michael Rolince, head of the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Section, or his deputy. Wilshire was also the key figure in the CIA’s withholding of information about Almihdhar and Alhazmi from the bureau.

These four people somehow managed to convince themselves that the Moussaoui case was a minor matter that deserved little attention and that the Minneapolis agents were, in Flack’s words, “maniacs.” Although very little is known about Wilshire’s involvement in the case, an e-mail used as evidence at the trial shows he shared this attitude; on August 24 he e-mailed his three colleagues asking for the latest on the “Minneapolis Airplane IV crowd,” although it is unclear whether this was a reference to Moussaoui and an associate or the Minneapolis field office.

This is one of the two key questions outstanding: where did this attitude come from? With hindsight, what the Minneapolis agents foresaw was not half as bad as what happened. It was not one airliner that flew into the WTC, but two, with another at the Pentagon and a fourth also aimed for Washington. Given the circumstances of the case, Minneapolis’ fears were reasonable and were shared both by a CIA detailee to the FBI, who predicted Moussaoui may crash a 747 into the White House, and at least one officer in the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center. Given that we still lack information about the interactions between the four participants, we cannot say with whom this bad attitude originated. However, we can say that Wilshire shared and supported it.

It would take too long to summarise all the obstacles thrown up, but here are two examples: when French intelligence reported that, yes, they knew Moussaoui and, yes, he was an Islamist militant, Maltbie objected that maybe they were talking about some other guy with the same name. Therefore, Maltbie argued, the FBI should search all the telephone directories in France to see how many people called Zacarias Moussaoui actually lived there.

The second example involves a comment made by Moussaoui’s imam on a phone monitored by the FBI to the presumed accomplice arrested with him. “I heard you guys wanted to go on jihad,” said the imam. “Don’t talk about that now,” was the reply. Frasca’s response upon learning this? “The jihad comment doesn’t concern me by itself in that this word can mean many things in various [M]uslim cultures and is frequently taken out of context.”

Other roadblocks included Frasca’s ban on Minneapolis applying for a criminal warrant itself, Maltbie blocking a referral to the Justice Department’s criminal division, Flack’s inability to provide the Phoenix memo to anyone else after she read it, the withholding of the relevant documentation from attorneys asked to assess the case, the deletion of key passages from an application for an intelligence warrant, etc., etc.

When the case became public knowledge after the attacks the bureau was a laughing stock—they arrested one of the hijackers (actually more of an associate) over three weeks before the attacks but were unable to even file a warrant application to search his luggage. What’s worse, the bureau was so completely clueless that it even failed to inform its own acting director, Thomas Pickard, of the case. How much more incompetent could it get? This dynamic was made even worse when one of the Minneapolis office employees, Coleen Rowley, went public with her criticism of FBI headquarters, becoming one of Time’s people of the year for 2002.

Logically, if the information came into FBI headquarters, but didn’t get to the acting director, it must have stopped with someone. So who was that someone? The most senior official to be told about the case was Rolince, but he received scant information on it for nearly two weeks. The two people below him were his consultant/deputy Tom Wilshire and RFU chief Dave Frasca and the blame needs to be shared between them. Exactly how it should be apportioned out we don’t know—the relevant reports, by the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Commission, and Justice Department inspector general, are silent on who should carry the can—and the inspector general omits even to mention that not informing the bureau’s director was a failure. This is symptomatic of the reports’ approach—nobody who performed badly was held accountable.

Wilshire’s role in the deliberate withholding of information from the FBI about Pentagon hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi makes his presence in the Moussaoui case alarming. However, although Wilshire certainly had a malign influence on the case, there is no smoking-gun proof of wilful malfeasance on his part. What we do know, however, is that this case was a significant stimulus for the reform of the US intelligence community. Without knowing what actually happened here and why, we have no way of judging whether those reforms were warranted and appropriate. Perhaps it would have been better to fire those who performed badly, instead of promoting them.

# # # #

Kevin Fenton is the author of Disconnecting the Dots: How CIA and FBI Officials Helped Enable 9/11 and Evaded Government Investigations.

The post Zacarias Moussaoui: What We Don’t Know Might Hurt Us appeared first on 9/11 Truth News.

The authorization I gave the National Security Agency after September the 11th helped address that problem in a way that is fully consistent with my constitutional responsibilities and authorities. The activities I have authorized make it more likely that killers like these 9/11 hijackers will be identified and located in time.

-President Bush, December 17, 2005

In the aftermath of 9/11, reams of newsprint were given over to discussing the CIA and FBI failures before the attacks; the agency had some of the hijackers under surveillance and allegedly lost them, the bureau was unable even to inform its own acting director of the Zacarias Moussaoui case. However, the USA’s largest and most powerful intelligence agency, the National Security Agency, got a free ride. There was no outcry over its failings, no embarrassing Congressional hearings for its director. Yet, as we will see, the NSA’s performance before 9/11 was shocking.

It is unclear when the NSA first intercepted a call by one of the nineteen hijackers. Reporting indicates it began listening in on telephone calls to the home of Pentagon hijacker Khalid Almihdhar’s wife some time around late 1996. However, although Almihdhar certainly did stay there later, it is unclear whether he lived there at that time. The house, in the Yemeni capital of Sana’a, was a key target for the US intelligence community as it was Osama bin Laden’s communication hub, run by Almihdhar’s father-in-law Ahmed al-Hada.

The NSA kept the Yemen communications hub secret from the rest of the US intelligence community. However, Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, found out about it through an agency officer loaned to the NSA. Even after the discovery, the NSA refused to provide transcripts of the calls, meaning Alec Station could not crack the simple code the al-Qaeda operatives used. This was one reason the 1998 East African embassy bombings—assisted by al-Hada—were successful despite the bombers being known to numerous intelligence agencies.

 The first time the NSA is known for certain to have intercepted a call involving the hijackers was in early 1999, when the call involved Almihdhar and his fellow Flight 77 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi. The NSA did not disseminate a report on this call, although the heavily redacted text of the Congressional Inquiry’s 9/11 report indicates it should have. The NSA continued to intercept Almihdhar’s calls throughout 1999, when he apparently spoke to al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash, now languishing in Guantanamo Bay.

In late December 1999, the NSA picked up a call that tipped it off about al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit meeting—a unique meeting of al-Qaeda leaders in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur. The NSA alerted both the FBI and CIA, the latter of which monitored Almihdhar, Alhazmi and their various associates at the meeting in cooperation with Malaysian colleagues. However, the CIA claims, it did not learn much about what the participants were planning.

Almihdhar and Alhazmi then travelled via Bangkok and Hong Kong to Los Angeles, but, the CIA says, it lost them on the way.

 Nevertheless, beginning a few months before the two men moved in with an FBI informer in San Diego, they began making calls back to the Yemen hub. At this time Almihdhar was on the NSA’s watchlist and the agency intercepted the calls, but generally did not disseminate reports on them.

Continued at Boiling Frogs Post

The post The NSA and 9/11: Letting the Hijackers Go appeared first on 9/11 Truth News.

Eventually, Kevin signed up on my site, and started posting his information there. In September 2007, I started work on something I called the Who Is? Archives that was based on the material of the timeline. Kevin was kind enough to write several of the introductions for people mentioned.

The following is a written interview with Kevin Fenton, answering questions that I asked him. Thank you Kevin for taking the time, and I hope everyone buys your book, Disconnecting The Dots: How 9/11 Was Allowed To Happen. The information in it is essential to understanding the 9/11 attacks, and gives several examples of people that should have been held accountable, but weren’t.

What prompted you to get involved with the cause of 9/11 Justice?


Several years ago, I read The New Pearl Harbor by David Ray Griffin after learning of it on the web and thinking it might be interesting. After reading, I felt some of it held up fairly well, and some of his arguments did not hold up so well. I started to read things about 9/11 on the net and to delve more deeply into some of the issues.


Who are some of your influences as far as your work goes?


My biggest influence is undoubtedly Paul Thompson, who was responsible for a lot of the material at the 9/11 Timeline, which is now hosted by historycommons.org (previously cooperativeresearch.org). Paul seemed to think that there was something wrong with what you might call the “official” account of 9/11, but never seemed to be sure exactly what had really happened and he encouraged research based primarily on MSM articles and government documents.


How did you become involved with www.historycommons.org, and updating the famous “Complete 9/11 Timeline?”


I met Paul at a discussion forum on the net. He invited me to help out a couple of times and I accepted, going over the various hijackers initially, but then moving on to other topics and also other timelines hosted by historycommons.org.


Without being specific about where, what kind of work do you do?


You mean “real” work? I’m a translator. I live in the Czech Republic.


The information in your book focuses on Alec Station, the Yemen Hub, the CIA, the FBI, individuals like Tom Wilshire, Harry Samit, and others. Why did you first become interested in this aspect of 9/11, and how did you decide that this would be your focus for a book?


It was in 2006. The Yemen hub had been mentioned cryptically in a couple of passages in the 9/11 Commission Report and the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry report, but more information emerged after the warrantless wiretapping story was run by the New York Times. Specifically, President Bush mentioned the calls in his response and then they were the subject of an LA Times rebuttal-type piece by Josh Meyer. A few months later, an unredacted version of the unclassified version of the Justice Department inspector general’s report was published after the Moussaoui trial ended and Lawrence Wright published the Looming Tower, which gave a lot of details about the CIA aspect of the story.

If there was one moment that made me think “This can’t be right,” then it was when I started breaking down the Justice Department inspector general’s report for 9/11 Timeline entries. I had the report as a .pdf file and I searched for “John,” Wilshire’s alias. Although I had already read the report a couple of times, this was the first time I noticed that “John” was involved in both the withholding of information from the FBI in January 2000 and the summer of 2001. Previously, I had thought that a variety of officials had failed to pass information, but I now realized this assumption was wrong and that there was a central character.

I was working on this throughout 2006 and the first part of 2007. I hoped somebody who was an established writer would come along and take up the topic and give it a fair treatment. A guy named Bob Schopmeyer wrote a book that goes over the same ground as I do, but it had a different style and also contained a lot of information that was not relevant to what I thought needed to be said. After waiting a while, I realized nobody else was out there and I had to do it myself. The second draft, which was fairly similar to the finished version, was completed around January 2009. I still hope a more established writer will come along, find more information and write an improved version of Disconnecting.


Do you think it is more or less likely that individuals like Tom Wilshire, Dave Frasca, and others were acting on their own or under the direction of others?


There is a group of individuals that the book deals with where I was unable to come to a firm conclusion as to whether they knew they were doing wrong when they performed poorly, and Frasca is a member of that group. Maybe he was just a bureaucratic asshole who was not too hot in the competence stakes. Then again, maybe he knew he was doing wrong.

Wilshire is a different case. The number of times he withheld information from the Bureau and a number of other factors show clearly that he knew he was doing something he should not have been. However, Wilshire was deputy chief of a unit with a couple of dozen officers, so, in my opinion, he was too junior to orchestrate the whole thing. He reported to a manager named Richard Blee, son of Cold War hero David Blee.

One of the questions I address in the book is whether Blee’s bosses, CIA Counterterrorist Center chief Cofer Black and CIA Director George Tenet, knew what Blee was doing at the time. The way it looks to me, based on the evidence we have now, is that Blee acted without Black and Tenet’s knowledge. For example, on two occasions in January 2000 Blee gave Black incorrect briefings about the whereabouts of alleged Flight 77 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and, given the amount of cable traffic into and out of Alec Station, it is hard to believe that Blee did not know what was really going on. Also, the CIA station in Malaysia made some small-to-medium-sized mistakes in January 2000, but on three occasions somebody there went above and beyond the call of duty to try and get something done. For example, the station chief there showed the photos taken at the summit to an FBI agent. If the CIA Director was on board with the plot to keep the FBI out of the loop, why was the CIA station in Malaysia not also on board? Obviously, none of this is to deny that Black and Tenet must have figured out a good portion of what Blee did after the attacks and then covered up for him.


Are there other areas of 9/11 that interest you? Things like the air response, intelligence connections to “Al-Qaeda,” foreign support for the hijackers, etc…?


I’m pretty much interested in all of it to a degree. However, I’m not a technical type and therefore focus on non-technical aspects. Obviously, some aspects of 9/11 skepticism are more credible than others.


What are your feelings about Philip Zelikow, the Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission?


After the second draft of the book was finished, the National Archives made available a portion of the commission’s files. An associate, Erik Larson, went to the Archives and started to upload the commission documents to the web. I started writing stories based on the files Erik found, one of which was critical of Zelikow. This led to a brief exchange of emails with Zelikow, although he did not give me much new information and kept his cards close to his chest (it was mostly about the air defense on 9/11, not what Disconnecting is about).

My opinion of government officials in general is that they are intelligent, nice and incredibly straight people. They often have a hard time thinking that their colleagues, also intelligent, nice and seemingly straight people, would ever do anything intentionally wrong. This attitude was prevalent on the commission. For example, it’s crystal clear from Shenon’s book that a whole bunch of people on the commission thought CIA Director George Tenet was, at best, economical with the truth, but there’s not a word of this in the report. In addition, judging by what Shenon wrote, nobody ever stopped to ask themselves just why Tenet was lying, what, specifically, was he trying to hide. Also remember the list of chapter headings that Zelikow drafted in the first few months of the investigation and that Philip Shenon exposed in his book? Zelikow knew what he wanted to write more or less from the beginning and was predisposed to follow that course, not to go where the evidence took him.

If I were Tom Wilshire or Richard Blee I would have slept soundly in my bed at night knowing that Barbara Grewe (the DoJ IG and commission investigator responsible for the CIA/FBI issues) and Philip Zelikow were investigating me. Better, more thorough and more skeptical investigators would have got further. Here’s one example of how it should have been done differently: Tenet lied to the commission under oath about not briefing President Bush in mid-August 2001. He then sent out a press release saying he had momentarily forgot about it. OK, so call him back, put him under oath again and have him answer the question.


There are some who claim to be advocates for 9/11 Justice that have a problem with your book because it focuses on the hijackers. Because according to some, there either were no hijackers, or they were “patsies” and the planes were remote controlled. What do you have to say to these individuals?


Disconnecting is a narrowly focused book. It is about the intelligence failures before 9/11. It is pretty clear to me that Almihdhar and Alhazmi were real people and there is evidence they were on the planes (although not all evidence the government says it has is public and you might want to put a question mark over one or two things that are out there). There are lots of people who met them in the States and spoke about it afterwards; there is also a fair amount of documentation about them that was released at the time of the Moussaoui trial. It is also clear they were AQ operatives. Almihdhar lived at AQ’s operations hub—how much more connected could you get?

I’m not a pilot and I can’t really add any expertise to the question of whether the alleged pilots would have been able to fly the planes the way they did with only the training the FBI says they had. However, I don’t think much of the FBI’s investigation, so there is always the possibility that they had training the Bureau did not uncover, or even did uncover, but did not make public. In this context recall that the anthrax scare started a short time after 9/11 and that a lot of agents were diverted away from investigating the attacks to what became the Bureau’s attempt to fit up Steven Hatfill.

Finally, I would say that we don’t really know the half of it. Let’s keep an open mind on what really happened.


Do you think there will ever be real accountability and justice for what happened that day? What would that look like to you?

To answer the second part of the question first: We would have to know exactly what happened, which means making the relevant documents public (not just some investigators writing a report based on evidence that is then withheld) and having witnesses testify publicly and under oath for a credible investigation (meaning: non-partisan, international). Once we know what happened we could then proceed to impose sanctions on people who had performed poorly or engaged in intentional wrongdoing.

Do I ever think this will happen? No. On the brighter side, I do think the media (at least the international media) has become a lot more adversarial and skeptical since 9/11. Compare the response to the 9/11 Commission report (fawning admiration) to the response to the FBI’s claims about Bruce Ivins (downright skepticism in some cases). I think this was more powered by the fallout from the decision to invade Iraq and the failure to find WMDs there than anything to do with alternative accounts of 9/11, but it certainly is positive. If 9/11 happened again, I think the response to it in terms of public skepticism of the government’s account would be different.

The post Questions and Answers with Kevin Fenton appeared first on 9/11 Truth News.

Who Is Ahmed Al-Hada? With Introduction By Kevin Fenton

Who Is Margaret Gillespie? With Introduction By Kevin Fenton

Who Is Michael Maltbie? With Introduction By Kevin Fenton

Who Is Sherry Sabol? With Introduction By Kevin Fenton

FBI Documents Contradict 9/11 Commission Report

9/11 Timeline Update, Day Of 9/11, Hijackers, Saudi Connection, 3/16/2008

BCCI And Terrorism Finance – Additions To 9/11 Timeline As Of March 23, 2008

9/11 Commission, Al-Qaeda in Italy, Hijackers – 9/11 Timeline Additions – 3/30/2008

Victor Bout, Rich B, GWOT, Pakistan And Much More – Additions As Of April 5, 2008

Michael Mukasey, Day Of 9/11, Osama Bin Laden – 9/11 Timeline Additions As Of 4/20/08

Additions To The 9/11 Timeline As Of July 6, 2008

Anthrax, Embassy Bombings – Additions To The 9/11 Timeline As Of August 10, 2008

9/11 Commission, Anthrax – Additions To The 9/11 Timeline As Of August 31, 2008

United 93, 9/11 Commission – Additions To The 9/11 Timeline As Of September 21, 2008

Additions To The Timeline As Of 9/28/2008

The Co-Conspirators Of Tom Wilshire

Reaction To James Bamford Interview About CIA’s Protection Of Almihdhar And Alhazmi

Mixed Reaction To James Bamford’s Spy Factory

Bamford Answers One Question: What NSA IG Report?

Memo: Government ‘Minders’ at 9/11 Commission Interviews ‘Intimidated’ Witnesses

Zelikow Failed To Mention Possible Criminal Referral Of False Statements – NORAD/FAA

Two Days Before 9/11, Military Exercise Simulated Suicide Hijacking Targeting NY

Awareness Of Military Cell At FAA Headquarters Of Events On Day Of 9/11

The post The Kevin Fenton Collection appeared first on 9/11 Truth News.